The magnitude of the excess return on equity, especially during this century, appears excessive relative to the behavior of other macroeconomic variables. In the future, the real return on fixed income assets may be closer to the historical norm of 3 to 4 per cent. While stock returns will probably continue to dominate bond returns, they will not do so by nearly as wide a margin as they have over the past 65 years. The return on stocks in excess of the return on short-term bonds is called the equity premium. Because stocks are generally riskier than fixed income investments, it is to be expected that the return on stocks would exceed that on bonds. However, in 1985 Rajnish Mehra and Edward Prescott demonstrated that stocks, despite their risk, appear to offer investors excessive returns, while bonds offer puzzlingly low returns.2 The excessive return on equity is termed the "equity premium puzzle." Investors would have to be extraordinarily riskaverse, given the documented growth and variability of the economy, to accept such low returns on bonds while equity offered such superior returns. Such extreme risk-aversion appears to be inconsistent with data that reveal investor choice under uncertainty.
Many theories have been offered to explain the equity premium puzzle.3 The data that Mehra and Prescott analyzed covered a sufficiently long period of time and were derived from well documented sources. Thus no one questioned the validity of their return data.
I extended the time period analyzed by Mehra and Prescott back to 1802, while updating the returns on stocks and bonds to 1990. My analysis demonstrates that the returns from bonds during most of the 19th century and after 1980 were far higher than in the period analyzed by Mehra and Prescott. The equity premium is not nearly as large when viewed over this extended time span as it is in the post-1926 period. These data suggest that the excess return of stocks over bonds may be significantly smaller in the future than it has been over the past 65 years.
Long-Term Asset Returns
William Schwert has developed historical stock price series dating back to 1802; there are also some fragmentary data on stock returns dating to 1789. Table I gives the stock returns in each subperiod.
The average nominal arithmetic (or mean) return on stocks is 9.0 per cent per year over the entire period. Although this can be interpreted as the expected return on stocks over a 12-month period, it cannot be converted into a compound annual rate of return over periods longer than one year. Because of the mathematical properties of return calculations, the compound rate of return to a buy-and-hold strategy is measured by the geometric, rather than the arithmetic, return. To avoid the noted problems with federal government bond yields, I constructed a high-grade series that uses the minimum yield on Treasury bonds and high-grade municipal bond yields from 1800 to 1865 and high-grade municipal yields from 1865 to 1917. This is the high-grade bond series depicted in Figure A . Table II summarizes the statistics.
Short-Term Bonds Treasury bills, or short-term governments, did not exist before 1920. Data on commercial paper rates dating back to the 1830s are available from Macaulay, but during the 19th century commercial paper was subject to a high and variable risk premium, as Figure  C shows.18 These premiums often developed during or just prior to liquidity and financial crises (marked by NBER-designated recessions). There were also defaults on this paper, but there is insufficient information to correct the yield series for these defaults. Despite the obvious shortcomings of the data, there are few other short-term rates available for the early 19th century, and those that are available cover very short periods.
To remedy this deficiency, I constructed a synthetic short-term government series that removes the risk premium on commercial paper.1 I did so by using the relation between short and long-term interest rates that prevailed in Britain during the 19th century, where the yields for long and short-term bonds were more representative of high-grade securities. The construction of the U.S. series assumes that the term structure of high-grade interest Note that, by the end of the first subperiod, 1802-70, the accumulations in government bonds, bills and stocks were virtually identical. It is in the second and especially the third subperiods that stocks clearly dominated fixed income assets. The return on gold is clearly dominated by bonds and stocks over the entire period, but its appreciation did surpass bonds (but not stocks) over the past 65 years.
The Price Level and Asset Returns
The behavior of price levels is critical to any interpretation of asset price movements over time. Figure D displays striking aspects of these data is the relative constancy of the real returns on equity across all the subperiods. In the first subperiod, the average geometric real return on equity is 5.7 per cent; it is 6.6 per cent in the second subperiod and 6.4 per cent in the third.25 These figures imply that, although inflation increased substantially in the third subperiod, the nominal return on equity increased by an almost identical amount, so the return after inflation remained essentially unchanged. To the extent that stocks are claims on real assets, they might be expected to be good hedges against inflation over the long run. There is remarkable similarity in the yield trends in the U.K. and the U.S. The sharp decline in the real yields on fixed income securities in the U.S. was closely mirrored in the U.K. Statistical tests cannot reject the hypothesis that the return process was identical for both long and short-term real interest rates in the U.S. and the U.K. over the entire period. Finally, one cannot ignore the development of the capital markets, which transformed a highly segmented market for short-term instruments in the 19th century into one of the world's most liquid markets in this century.
Explanations of Trends
The Equity Premium The decline in the real return on fixed income investments has meant that the advantage of holding equities, which have experienced a remarkably steady real return, has increased over time. The equity premium, plotted in Figure I , has trended up over the last 200 years and was particularly high in the middle of this century. The premium, computed from real geometric returns, averaged 0.6 per cent in the first subperiod, 3.5 per cent in the second, and 5.9 per cent in the third.
The primary source of this equity premium has been the fall in the real return on bonds, not the rise in the return on equity. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to believe that the low real rates on bonds may, on occasion, have fueled higher equity returns, because the costs of obtaining leverage were so low. The highest 30-year average equity return occurred in 1931-61, a period that also experienced very low real returns on bonds.
One might take an even broader view of the superior returns on equity. Certainly investors in 1802 (or even 1872) did not universally expect the United States to become the greatest economic power in the next century. This was not the case in many other countries. What if one had owned stock in Japanese or German firms before World War II? Or consider Argentina, which, at the turn of the century, was one of the great economic powers. In some sense, the returns on U.S. stocks might not be representative of the broader international context.29
Conclusions
The high real interest rates in the 19th century may have reflected the possibility that the U.S. would default on its bonds or abandon the gold standard. Since the inflation shocks of the 1970s, fear of outright default has been replaced by an inflationary premium in nominal interest rates. Future inflation may be caused by growing U.S. government deficits or by inflationary policies pursued by the Federal Reserve in response to political pressures or economic crises.
The last 10 years represent only about 5 per cent of the total time examined in this study, but the period since 1980 contains the highest real long-term bond returns during any consecutive 10-year period since 1884 and the highest real short-term bond returns since the 19th century (excepting the sharp deflationary periods of the Depression). It is not unreasonable to assume that the current higher real rates will turn out to be more characteristic of future returns than the unusually low real rates of the earlier part of this century. If they do, then the advantage of holding equities over bonds will shrink from the levels reached over the past several generations. The holders of fixed income investments should enjoy enhanced real returns in the future. Equities, however, still appear to be the best route to long-term wealth accumulation.30 
